

CHICAGO TELETYPE
5 FEB 1973Bill Anderson

CIA: Criticism, inquiry, antagonism

WASHINGTON—Since the Bay of Pigs, when the United States lost its gamble under the Kennedy administration to overthrow Fidel Castro, the Central Intelligence Agency has suffered in many areas of public opinion.

It has also suffered internally, going thru a succession of directors and losing other key people under three Presidents [starting with Kennedy] who did not totally believe what the CIA reports were saying.

The CIA was created in 1946 by the late President Truman [as the Central Intelligence Group] from the skeleton of the wartime Office of Strategic Studies. It was formed in an effort to collect information [or spy] on other nations as much as they did on us. From the start, it was an agency cloaked in semi-secrecy noted for generating debate.

An early director, Adm. Roscoe H. Hillenkoetter, had warned the Truman administration of the then impending Communist invasion of South Korea—and apparently was replaced for his accurate prediction by Gen. Walter Bedell Smith.

Smith then grabbed headlines [during the Sen. Joseph R. McCarthy period] by stating in public there was a "moral certainty" that Communist spies had penetrated every security agency in Washington.

Smith did not last long at the CIA after that and was replaced by the

pipe-smoking Allen W. Dulles, brother of John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's secretary of state. Dulles put McCarthy down after the senator charged there were double agents operating within the CIA.

Dulles, the first civilian chief of the CIA, came off as sort of a super-spy because of his exploits in the OSS during World War II. After staving off McCarthy, he continued to build the CIA from a small agency [starting with 1,500 agents] to a worldwide network that began to do more than make estimates of what foreign powers might do.

Still, the Hoover commission looked into the operations of the agency and came up with a report saying it was lacking in collecting "intelligence data from behind the Iron Curtain." Meanwhile, the CIA squabbled with the long-established intelligence arms of the three military services. In one case it had enough clout to get the Army's chief of intelligence [G-2] fired.

By 1953 the CIA was spending \$350,000,000 a year [now it is spending about \$2 billion]. A year later it was warning that there was an intensive Communist drive underway in Latin America. And then the reef began to fall in on the agency after its secret spy plane, the U-2, was shot down over Russia. The incident caused even more drama and the cancellation of a United States-Russian summit meeting, along

with a public trial of pilot Francis G. Powers.

The public clamor really began, tho, after the attempted invasion of Cuba ordered by the late President Kennedy. The late Robert F. Kennedy personally ran an investigation of the agency as blame for the fiasco began to fall on the CIA for furnishing faulty data. After a short period of grace, Dulles left as director to be replaced by John A. McCone, a business executive.

Adm. William F. [Red] Raborn followed in the Johnson administration. Raborn's biggest early flap was a charge the CIA got involved in an Indonesian government upheaval. But the involvement also spread to the Congo, Viet Nam, and apparently to some domestic intelligence activities. The deputy director then was Richard Helms, a career government management expert.

Helms moved up to director during the Johnson era of 1966, assuring Congress that the CIA did not create foreign policy. Helms continued to feel public heat because of the CIA financing of foundations and student activities. He was defended by Sen. Kennedy at the time.

When Mr. Nixon became President, one of his first moves was to install a trusted associate of long standing—Marine Gen. Robert Cushman—as deputy director of the CIA. After getting his own reading on the agency, the President promoted Cushman to commandant of the corps—and is sending Helms to Iran as ambassador. Tomorrow we will report on the new director.

STATINTL

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500180007-0

TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE C.I.A.

STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

Every few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.

How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pressures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature of our aid to Laos."¹ There was no mention of the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 3, 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly] military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the . . . irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."²

There have been revelations about C.I.A. foreign operations before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in Laos is that they have been forced out of the Administration while the activities are still in progress. The revelations come also at a time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.

These events have led to the introduction in the present Congress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without congressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor of even one House, where both were decisively defeated by better than two-thirds majorities.³ The remarkable thing is that the activity was all confined to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Representatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.

Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.⁴ The Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been considerable pressure for such legislation only by announcing that all existing covert financial assistance to the nation's educational and private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the year.⁵ More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administration to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to provide open gov-

Approved For Release 2001/03/07 : CIA-RDP91-00901R000500180007-0

continued